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THE PRECEDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION OVER CHAPTER 11
BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION:
COMMONWEALTH OIL REFINING CO.
v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, 805 F.2d 1175
(5th Cir. 1986)
Chapter 11 bankruptcy' temporarily protects a debtor2 from his
creditors to foster his financial rehabilitation.3 A bankruptcy filing au-
tomatically stays new or continuing judicial proceedings and judg-
ments against the debtor.4 The Bankruptcy Reform Act5 (BRA),
however, exempts governmental units' 6 use of police7 or regulatory
1. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended at II U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1986)),
controls both Chapter II and Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Chapter 11 governs debtor reor-
ganization, while Chapter 7 governs debtor liquidation. See generally Termini, The Im-
pact of Filing Bankruptcy on Environmental Protection: Police Power and the Automatic
Stay 11 U.S.C. § 362, 6 NORTHROP U.L.J. 1 (1985) (A review of bankruptcy proceed-
ings and the effects of stays on police power in environmental regulation).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129 (1982) allows a debtor 120 days to submit a reorganiza-
tion plan.
3. Brief for Appellants Committee of Unsecured Creditors and Indenture Trustee at
30, Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 805 F.2d 1175
(5th Cir. 1986) (No. 85-2828) [hereinafter Appellants Briefi.
4. The Bankruptcy Reform Act provides in pertinent part: (a) Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of
(1) the commencement or continuation.. . of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(2) (1984).
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, supra note 1.
6. The BRA explicitly limits the definition of governmental unit to true governmen-
tal entities:
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power from automatic stay8 to the extent that the unit does not at-
tempt to enforce a money judgment9 against the debtor.' In Com-
monwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency,11 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
"Governmental unit" means United States; State; Commonwealth; District, Ter-
ritory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the
United States (but not a United States Trustee while serving as a trustee in a case
under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality,
or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.
11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (1984).
Environmental organizations suing as private attorneys general under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(1) (1972) to enforce environmental regulations are not governmental units
with respect to the BRA's automatic stay exceptions as codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)
(1978). In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 32 Bankr. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See text of
§ 362(b)(4), infra note 8.
7. The police power is the government's power to act in the public interest. It is not
otherwise easily defined, but it is the cumulative result of many legislative acts. Berman
v. Barker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Only the Constitution limits the police power. Ha-
waii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239 (1984). The police power "includes
everything essential to the public safety, health and morals." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133, 136 (1894). For an extensive list of state police powers, see 152 U.S. at 136.
8. The BRA provides in pertinent part:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... does not
operate as a stay
(4) ... under subsection a(l) of this section, of the commencement or continuation
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's police or regulatory power ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1978).
9. The common definition of a money judgment is "[a] final order, decree, or judg-
ment of a court by which a defendant is required to pay a sum of money in contrast to a
decree or judgment in equity in which the court orders some other type of relief; e.g.
injunction or specific performance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 907 (5th ed. 1979).
Enforcement of a money judgment differs from the entry of a money judgment in that
enforcement constitutes seizure of the defendant's property. Penn Terra Ltd. v. Depart-
ment of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 275 (3d Cir. 1984). The Penn Terra court also
stated that "[e]xecution upon a money judgment is the legal process of enforcing the
judgment, usually by seizing and selling the property of the debtor." 733 F,2d at 275
n.9 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 510 (5th ed. 1979)). The seizure of a com-
pany's assets is inapposite to the BRA's goals because seizure depletes assets necessary
for the company's survival as well as depleting assets claimed by other creditors.
10. The BRA provides in pertinent part:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title.., does not
operate as a stay ....
(5) under subsection a(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other
than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1978).
11. 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987).
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that an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action requiring a
Chapter 11 debtor's continuing operations 2 to comply with environ-
mental protection laws 3 did not constitute an attempt to enforce a
money judgment and that the BRA did not automatically stay the
action. 1
4
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976"5 (RCRA)
requires hazardous waste' 6 facilities to obtain EPA permits.17 On No-
vember 18, 1980, Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. (CORCO) obtained
interim status,18 thus allowing it to operate temporarily without a per-
12. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. rented its storage facilities to other industrial
companies after it stopped refining petrochemicals on March 3, 1982. Id. at 1179.
13. The EPA charged Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. with violations of the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which requires:
(2) In the case of each land disposal facility which has been granted interim sta-
tus under this subsection before the date of enactment of the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984, interim status shall terminate on the date twelve
months after the date of the enactment of such Amendments unless the owner or
operator of such facility
(A) applies for a final determination regarding issuance of a permit under sub-
section (c) for such facility before the date twelve months after the date of the
enactment of such Amendments; and
(B) certifies that such facility is in compliance with all applicable groundwater
monitoring and financial responsibility requirements.
RCRA § 3005(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2) (1984).
14. 805 F.2d at 1188.
15. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1984)). RCRA's objectives are
to "promote the protection of health and environment and to conserve material and
energy resources. . . ." RCRA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1984).
16. Hazardous waste is a solid which may cause or contribute to illness or death or
which poses a "substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environ-
ment when improperly" managed. RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1986).
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. became subject to RCRA when the company placed
hazardous waste in its Puerto Rico facility's surface impoundment. 805 F.2d at 1180.
17. The EPA administrator has the duty to promulgate regulations related to the
issuance of hazardous waste facility permits. RCRA § 3005(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a)
(1986).
18. Congress created "interim status" to allow facilities whose permit applications
are backlogged by the EPA to continue the affected operations pending final EPA ac-
tion on their permit application. 805 F.2d at 1178. A facility must meet three statutory
requirements to obtain interim status. The facility must have 1) existed on November
19, 1980 or on the effective date of the statutory or regulatory change creating the
permit requirement, 2) notified the EPA of its activity which is newly regulated, and
3) filed a Part A permit application conforming with EPA regulations. Id. The Part A
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mit 19 The EPA requested CORCO's Part B2" permit application in
April 1984.21 Rather than honoring the EPA's request, CORCO chose
to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Western District of Texas in July 1984.22 The company
subsequently petitioned the court to determine the BRA's automatic
stay applicability to the EPA's impending RCRA enforcement ac-
tion.23 After the court deemed the EPA action exempt from automatic
stay,24 the Agency filed an administrative complaint citing CORCO for
RCRA violations.25 The EPA also issued a compliance order requir-
ing the company to discontinue, or obtain a permit for, its hazardous
Application consists of general descriptive information about the facility in question.
See 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.1(b), 270.10(e), 270.13 (1987).
Final EPA action on the permit application begins when the EPA requests the com-
pany to submit the permit application's second part, known as Part B. Id. Part B
consists of detailed information enabling the EPA to decide if an operating permit
should be granted. Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 270.14 to .29 (1987). The interim status of
a company that fails to submit Part B within six months of the EPA's request may be
terminated. 805 F.2d at 1178. A company whose interim status is terminated on the
EPA's refusal to issue an operating permit has fifteen days to submit a plan to close its
facility. Id.
19. 805 F.2d at 1179.
20. See supra note 18 for discussion of Part B permit applications.
21. 805 F.2d at 1179.
22. Id. The court said that the company told "the EPA that it would not submit its
Part B application or a closure plan." Id. The Appellants Committee of Unsecured
Creditors and Indenture Trustee countered that CORCO sought to defer completing
the application or closure plan until it decided the nature of its postreorganization busi-
ness. Appellants Brief, supra note 3, at 13.
23. 805 F.2d at 1179. The EPA, upon finding that a RCRA violation has occurred,
may issue a compliance order or may begin a civil action in the United States district
court to procure appropriate relief for that violation. RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928
(1984). In the instant case, CORCO violated 40 C.F.R. § 270.1(b) (1980), by failing to
submit its Part B application within six months of the EPA's request. 805 F.2d at 1179.
CORCO also raised mootness as a defense in relation to its interim status termination
date. Id. at 1180. Congress provided in RCRA § 3005(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2)
(1984) that the interim status of a land disposal facility would terminate automatically
on November 8, 1985, unless the operator filed Part B of his permit application before
that date. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision on November 5,
1985. See infra note 28. The Fifth Circuit held that the question of mootness need not
be resolved as long as a viable claim existed. 805 F.2d at 1181. The court found that a
controversy still existed between the EPA and CORCO and concluded that it thus had
jurisdiction of the case. Id.
24. In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 58 Bankr. 608, 615 (W.D. Tex. 1985). The
bankruptcy court said that Kovacs, see infra note 51, controlled and that "the automatic
stay provision does not apply to suits to enforce a State's regulatory statutes." Id.
25. 805 F.2d at 1179. The EPA alleged that CORCO failed to submit its Part B
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waste activities and to file closure and postclosure plans for certain fa-
cilities.26 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas affirmed the bankruptcy court's holding.27 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court decision28 on
CORCO's appeal.29
The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 193830 required Chapter 11
bankruptcy petitioners to allege insolvency.31 Congress, reasoning that
business preservation would improve society's economic stability, 32 re-
pealed the insolvency requirement in 1978 when it enacted the BRA.
Between 1938 and 1978, however, the legislature also subjected indus-
try to increasing environmental regulation.33 Congress did not explic-
itly address the resulting issue of whether a court may impose
compliance with environment regulations upon a solvent bankruptcy
petitioner's continuing operation, notwithstanding the necessity of
permit application, failed to operate a groundwater monitoring system, and operated its
facilities after expiration of its interim status. Id.
26. Id. at 1179-80. The EPA asked that CORCO be compelled to submit closure
plans for its land disposal facilities and slop oil tank and to submit postclosure plans for
the land disposal facilities. Id.
27. Id. at 1180. "[A]n injunction restraining enforcement of the environmental
laws would disturb the public interest." Id.
28. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
No. SA-85-CA-2044, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 1985).
29. Id. at 1190.
30. Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
31. "Every petition shall state ... (1) that the corporation is insolvent or unable to
pay its debts as they mature ...." 11 U.S.C. § 530(1) (1970).
32. Termini, supra note 1, at 4. A company which reorganizes continues to provide
societal benefits, such as employment, creditor payment, and shareholder return, during
its reorganization. A continuing business' value is higher than that of a business sold for
scrap. Congress' repeal of the insolvency requirement allows a debtor to reorganize
while still viable, as opposed to burdening the company with potentially unmanageable
debt. Id. See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6179.
33. E.g., Occupational Health and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1982)); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1984)); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1986)).
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money expenditures.
34
Department of Environmental Resources v. Peggs Run Coal Co. 35
marked the first application of section 362(b)(4)'s automatic stay to
environmental litigation. 36 In Peggs Run the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources (DER) alleged that Peggs Run, a
Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, maintained a public nuisance and vio-
lated state environmental statutes.37 The DER prayed for injunctive
relief and for the posting of assurance bonds. 38 Peggs Run responded
by asserting that section 362 of the BRA stayed all creditor actions.
39
The court disagreed, however, noting that section 362(b)(5), 4 ° which
prohibits a governmental unit's enforcement of a money judgment
against a debtor, applies only to outstanding money judgments, not to
judgments arising after the debtor petitioned for bankruptcy.4 ' The
legislative history of sections 362(b)(4) and 362(b)(5)4 2 further per-
34. Termini, supra note 1, at 2-3.
35. 55 Pa. Commw. 312, 423 A.2d 765 (1980).
36. Id. The federal bankruptcy courts first mentioned BRA § 362(b)(4) in an envi-
ronmental context in In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979).
Canarico Quarries petitioned for a stay of its creditors' proceedings under Rules of
Bankruptcy 11-44(a) prior to the BRA's effective date of October 1, 1979. Id. at 1335.
The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico cited § 362(b)(4) as
supporting, although not controlling, in holding that the BRA's automatic stay excep-
tions evidenced Congress' intent "that public interest regulations are to outweigh
[those] of the Bankruptcy Act and Rules in case of conflict." Id. at 1339-40.
37. 55 Pa. Commw. at 313-14, 423 A.2d at 766. The DER alleged that Peggs Run,
the operator of a coal mine, a coal cleaning plant, and a coal refusal disposal area,
violated Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Law, Act of June 22, 1937, P.L. 1987 (codified as
amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Purdon 1986)), the Air Pollution
Control Act, Act of January 8, 1960, P.L. 2119 (1959) (codified as amended at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4001-4015 (Purdon 1986)), and the Rules and Regulations of the
Environmental Quality Board, 25 PA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1.1-951.12 (1986). Id.
38. 55 Pa. Commw. at 313-14, 423 A.2d at 766.
39. 55 Pa. Commw. at 314, 423 A.2d at 766. See supra note 4 for the text of the
BRA's automatic stay provision.
40. 55 Pa. Commw. at 315, 423 A.2d at 767. See supra note 10 for the text of BRA
§ 362(b)(5).
41. 55 Pa. Commw. at 316, 423 A.2d at 767. The stay authorized by BRA
§ 362(a)(2) applies only to judgments obtained before the commencement of the case.
See supra note 4 (text of statute).
42. Congress' desire to protect the environment is evident in the BRA's legislative
history:
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions and proceedings
by governmental units to enforce police or regulatory powers. Thus, where a gov-
ernmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmen-
talprotection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or
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suaded the court to exempt the DER's use of its regulatory power from
the automatic stay.43
Four years later, in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental
Resources,' the Third Circuit held that a state environmental depart-
ment action was an "obvious" application of the state's police or regu-
latory functions under section 362(b)(4).45 More importantly, the
court construed section 362(b)(5)'s phrase "enforcement of a money
judgment."46 Lacking congressional guidance, the Third Circuit stated
that the elements of a money judgment were "an identification of the
parties for and against whom judgment [was] entered, and a definite
and certain designation of the amount" that the defendant owed the
plaintiff.47 The court recognized that the DER's request, seeking to
compel Penn Terra's performance of certain remedial acts,48 indicated
that the Department sought action rather than money.49 The court
held that the absence of a request for definite monetary damages pre-
attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is
not stayed under the automatic stay. Paragraph (5) makes clear that the exception
extends to permit an injunction and enforcement of an injunction, and to permit
the entry of a money judgment, but does not extend to permit enforcement of a
money judgment. Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession and control of
the bankruptcy court, and since they constitute a fund out of which all creditors
are entitled to share, enforcement by a governmental unit of a money judgment
would give it preferential treatment to the detriment of all other creditors.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5838; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6296-97 (emphasis added).
43. 55 Pa. Commw. at 316-17, 423 A.2d at 767. The court quoted the BRA's legis-
lative history, supra note 42.
44. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). Penn Terra operated its coal surface mines in
violation of various Pennsylvania environmental protection statutes. The company en-
tered into a consent order with the DER to remedy the violations. Before doing so, the
company petitioned for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, having assets of $14,000 and debts of
$660,000. The DER sued Penn Terra to enforce the terms of the consent order. Id. at
269-70.
45. The court, commenting on the DER's request to force Penn Terra to remedy
the harmful environmental hazards caused by the company, stated that "[n]o more ob-
vious exercise of the State's power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public
can be imagined." Id. at 274.
46. Id. at 274-78.
47. Id. at 274-75.
48. Id. at 270. The DER asked the court to compel Penn Terra to reclaim two
mines, to seal one of the mines, to remove top soil placed over a gas line, and to control
erosion and sedimentation at the mine sites. Id.
49. Id. at 275-76.
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eluded the existence or enforcement of a money judgment."
The Penn Terra court was concerned, however, that a plaintiff's
"artful pleading" could disguise enforcement of a money judgment as
equitable relief.51 The court suggested that scrutiny of the nature of
the plaintiff's action, rather than his claim, might reveal whether the
plaintiff sought a money judgment or equitable relief.52 The court
noted that compensation for a prior wrong is usually "definite and cer-
tain" and the parties to the action are determinable. 3 The cost of pro-
tection from future harm, however, lacks the definite character of a
money judgment.54 Thus, a suit to compel an act designed to prevent
future harm is less likely to be a money judgment enforcement than is
compensation for a prior wrong.55 Finally, the court stated that in to-
50. Id. at 275. Compare Penn Terra with Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). The
State of Ohio sued Kovacs, the chief executive officer and stockholder of a chemical
company who had a share in a hazardous waste disposal site, individually and on his
company's behalf for violations of state environmental laws. 469 U.S. at 276-77. He
settled the lawsuit, signing a stipulation and judgment entry to clean up the property,
but defaulted on the agreement. Id. at 277. A state court appointed a receiver who
took possession of Kovacs' property and began to implement the judgment entry. Id.
The Supreme Court noted that the appointment of a receiver who must comply with
state law and who sought money from the bankrupt (to remedy a hazardous waste site)
constituted a money judgment enforcement in contravention of 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(2),
(b)(5). Id. at 283 n. 11. Note that Kovacs filed for bankruptcy after entry of the judg-
ment against him. The EPA had not had a judgment entered against CORCO before
CORCO filed a petition in bankruptcy. Id.
51. 733 F.2d at 276. The court cited Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.
1979), as an example of a case in which the plaintiff couched a prayer for money dam-
ages as equitable relief. Jaffee requested an order requiring medical care. The Jaffee
court found that the payment of money could satisfy Jaffee's request. Thus, the claim
for equitable relief disguised a request for the enforcement of a money judgment,
notwithstanding the form of the prayer. Id. at 276.
52. Id. at 276.
53. Id. at 275.
54. Id. at 276-77. The definition and certainty of compensation for the prior wrong
is one of the elements of the money judgment as defined by the Third Circuit. See supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 217. "[A] traditional money judgment requires liquidated damages, i.e., a
sum certain, and one cannot liquidate damages which have not yet been suffered. Nor
can one calculate such sum with certainty. Indeed, the very nature of injunctive relief is
that it addresses injuries which may not be compensated by money." Id. The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a town's enforcement of its zon-
ing ordinances against a debtor-in-possession is exempt from the automatic stay provi-
sion of § 362(a) by virtue of §§ 362(b)(4)-(5). Cournoyer v. Town of Lincoln, 790 F.2d
971, 977 (1st Cir. 1986). Cournoyer petitioned for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on June 25,
1982. Id. at 973. On April 8, 1983, the Rhode Island Superior Court ordered the town
to clear Cournoyer's land of scrap trucks and parts. Id. The First Circuit held that this
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day's society virtually everything costs something.16 To restrict a gov-
ernmental unit's ability to exercise its police or regulatory power over a
bankruptcy petitioner by prohibiting the imposition of financial liabil-
ity would effectively nullify section 362(b)(4).57
In Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency,58 CORCO argued that section 362(a)(1) of the BRA
should automatically stay the EPA's attempts to force the company's
continuing operations to comply with environmental laws and regula-
tions.59 While the Fifth Circuit recognized that the automatic stay
protects a debtor from his creditors,' the court also noted that the
automatic stay is not absolute, as evidenced in the several exceptions
provided by Congress. 61 One exception to the automatic stay is a gov-
ernmental unit's action to enforce its police or regulatory power pursu-
ant to section 362(b)(4). 62 The Fifth Circuit approved the bankruptcy
court's conclusion that the EPA's action was the type of environmen-
tally protective action Congress intended to exempt from the automatic
stay. 63
CORCO also argued that if the court compelled it to comply with
the EPA order, it would be required to spend money.64 Compelled
expenditures, the company argued, would constitute the enforcement
of a money judgment against it,6' effectively violating section
action was not a money judgment enforcement because the town did not seek money
from Cournoyer, but sought instead to clear his property. Id. at 976.
56. 733 F.2d at 278.
57. Id. at 277-78.
58. 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 1182.
60. Id. The automatic stay also protects creditors by preventing preferential treat-
ment of one creditor, i.e., the fastest to file a claim against the debtor over other credi-
tors. See supra notes 42-43.
61. Id. at 1182-83. See supra note 43.
62. Id. at 1182. See supra note 8 (text of statute).
63. Id. at 1183 (quoting In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 58 Bankr. 608, 612
(W.D. Tex. 1985)). The BRA's legislative history, supra note 43, enumerates several
types of action, including environmental protection, that are exempt from automatic
stay. Any actions pursuant to RCRA appear to be exempt from automatic stay because
the RCRA objectives, supra note 15, include the "promotion of health and the environ-
ment .... " RCRA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1984).
64. "The result of the EPA's order requires Corco to commit either $500,000 to
comply with the Permit B procedure or $1,000,000 to comply with EPA closure plans
to shut down the facility." Appellants Brief, supra note 3, at 12-13.
65. 805 F.2d at 1186.
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362(b)(5).66  The court, citing Penn Terra, stated that section
362(b)(5)'s scope would be significantly limited if all orders requiring
money expenditure were construed to enforce money judgments.67
The court also stated that a money judgment must include a "definite
and certain" amount that the defendant owes the plaintiff.68 The
EPA's action was not, in the court's opinion, a money judgment en-
forcement because CORCO would not pay money to the EPA in com-
plying with the order. 69 Rather, the company would pay salaries or
fees to employees or consultants for preparation of the Part B applica-
tion.70 Finally, the court applied the Penn Terra test,71 which exam-
ines whether the EPA sought compensation for past damages or to
prevent future harm, to ascertain whether the EPA was attempting to
enforce a money judgment as equitable relief.72 Determining that the
EPA sought only to prevent future harm, the court held that the EPA
did not seek to enforce a money judgment. 73 Having already deter-
mined that the EPA validly exercised its regulatory power,74 the court
concluded that the EPA's actions fit squarely within section 362(b)(4)'s
police and regulatory exception to the BRA's automatic stay.75 The
court further held that the EPA's actions were exempt from stay by
virtue of section 362(b)(5).76
The Fifth Circuit reached the correct conclusion in Commonwealth
Oil Refining Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency by
evincing a literal interpretation of the controlling BRA sections.77
66. See supra note 10 for text of statute.
67. 805 F.2d at 1186. Other courts have addressed the dilemma that an injunction
may require the expenditure of money. See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d
Cir. 1982). The possibility that an injunction might require the expenditure of money
does not necessarily eliminate that form of relief. Id. at 211-13.
68. 805 F.2d at 1186-87. See supra note 47 and accompanying text for the Penn
Terra definition of "money judgment."
69. Id. at 1187-88.
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 45, 52-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Penn
Terra test.
72. Id. at 1187.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1183.
75. Id. at 1183-84.
76. Id. at 1188.
77. Id. at 1184. The court rebuked Commonwealth's arguments that BRA
§§ 362(b)(4)-(5) should only apply in situations where there was "imminent and identi-
fiable harm" by literally interpreting those sections. Commonwealth had asserted that
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Nevertheless, the court partially misconstrued the applicable statutes.
Courts must analyze the automatic stay provisions of section 362 from
two viewpoints: actions pursuant to governmental police or regulatory
powers and actions to enforce judgments.
The court correctly construed sections 362(a)(1) and 362(b)(4). Sec-
tion 362(a)(1) automatically stays proceedings against a debtor, while
section 362(b)(4) excepts actions by governmental units exercising their
police or regulatory powers from stay. Commonwealth was a debtor.
The EPA exercised its regulatory power when it issued the compliance
order against Commonwealth. Thus, the court correctly refused to
stay the EPA's actions against Commonwealth as those actions were a
proper exercise of governmental police or regulatory power.
The court, however, needlessly discussed the relationship between
sections 362(a)(2) and 362(b)(5) of the BRA. The Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court called attention to the relationship between the sec-
tions when it stated in Peggs Run that money judgments obtained
against a debtor by a governmental unit before the debtor files in bank-
ruptcy are unenforceable.78 Section 362(b)(5) exempts from stay the
enforcement of all prebankruptcy government claims except for money
judgments.79 Judgments obtained by governmental units pursuant to
their police or regulatory powers after the debtor fies in bankruptcy
are excepted from stay by section 362(b)(4). The court also mistakenly
relied on Penn Terra because the DER had established a claim against
Penn Terra"0 before the company filed in bankruptcy."1 The EPA did
not have a judgment outstanding against Commonwealth Oil Refining
when it filed in bankruptcy.8 2 Thus, neither section 362(a)(2) nor
362(b)(5) applied to Commonwealth's case.
precedent set in Midlantic Nat'l. Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494 (1986), prevented the invocation of the relevant BRA sections in the absence of
"imminent and identifiable harm." The court distinguished Midlantic from Common-
wealth on the basis that Midlantic represented a question of the scope of a bankruptcy
trustee's abandonment power, under 11 U.S.C. § 554(a), while Commonwealth did not.
805 F.2d at 1185.
78. 55 Pa. Commw. at 316, 423 A.2d at 767 ("[T]he exception described in Section
362(b)(5) should be read in connection with part (a)(2) of the section .. .
79. Id.
80. 733 F.2d at 269. The DER and Penn Terra entered into a consent order and
agreement that the company would rectify alleged environmental infractions. Id.
81. Id. at 270.
82. Commonwealth Oil Refining filed in bankruptcy on July 11, 1984. It had re-
ceived an extension from the EPA to delay submission of Part B until December 7, 1984
and did not become in default until after it had filed in bankruptcy. 805 F.2d at 1179.
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Finally, the Fifth Circuit cursorily addressed the policy conflict be-
tween environmental preservation and business preservation. The
court's reliance on Penn Terra is misleading because Penn Terra was
insolvent and had filed for Chapter 7 liquidation,83 whereas CORCO
was solvent and had filed for reorganization under Chapter 11.1 4
Although Penn Terra's compliance with the DER's orders would
quickly exhaust its remaining assets,85 it would not be greatly affected
due to its insolvency. CORCO's compliance with the EPA's orders, on
the other hand, could conceivably worsen the company's financial posi-
tion. An insolvent company does not further Congress' goal of eco-
nomic stabilization.86 The Fifth Circuit's decision would have been
more persuasive if it had acknowledged Congress' mandate that debt-
ors-in-possession shall obey all applicable laws and regulations.87
Through Commonwealth Oil Refining, the Fifth Circuit has signified
that the Bankruptcy Reform Act will not shield a solvent company
from environmental laws requiring compliance expenditures.
Although compliance with environmental legislation might cause some
Chapter 11 debtors to liquidate, environmental protection is a cost of
doing business which cannot be ignored.
William A. Shirley
83. 733 F.2d at 270.
84. 805 F.2d at 1179. Whereas Penn Terra sought to make orderly distributions to
creditors, CORCO's objective was to maintain funds to enable it to come out of
bankruptcy.
85. 733 F.2d at 270. Penn Terra listed assets of $14,000 and debts of $660,000 in its
bankruptcy petition. Id.
86. The court could have examined the cost to satisfy the EPA's orders and the
amount of CORCO's assets. Analysis of each such bankruptcy/environmental conflict,
however, would strain the court system.
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 959, which provides in pertinent part:
b) [A] trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court
of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the
property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the
requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the
same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in pos-
session thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1978).
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